I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the United States and international criminal tribunals has lasted for almost 100 years at least. At first glance, a chronology of the relationship would lead one to think that the United States policy has been extremely inconsistent. This would be displayed only after comparing the United States' dissent against an international criminal tribunal after World War I (WWI), to the United States' support of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) after World War H (WWII), and its support of an International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Genocide Convention.
Beginning in the early 1990's, the United States did not support a Security Council (SC) international tribunal for Iraq, but later changed its position as well as supported SC international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In 1993, the United States supported the creation of the permanent ICC, but later voted against it in 1998. Considering these inconsistencies, it would seem that the United States does not have a consistent policy regarding international criminal tribunals.
Taking a closer look at the chronology, a consistent position would become clearer: the United States has not favored international criminal tribunals when there is substantial risk of United States nationals being indicted. The purpose of this section is to display, chronologically, how the United States has remained consistent with this position from post WWI to the present.
II. POST WORLD WAR I
After WWI the United States dissented against the creation of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute German war criminals, particularly the former Kaiser of Germany, Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, for his participation in acts of aggression which instigated the war.' The United States, however, did not argue against national prosecutions by any occupying Allied power or the state of the nationality of the accused and even favored a tribunal with "international character" if "formed by the union of existing national military tribunals or commissions. 2 Such a tribunal would not have been an "international" tribunal per se, but a multinational tribunal. Moreover, the United States stated in its dissent that "legal offenses were justiciable and liable to trial and punishment by appropriate tribunals.", 3 "Appropriate tribunals" would have been national courts, state or military, by either the state that the accused was a national citizen, or the state of an opposing army, or a tribunal combining national jurisdiction voluntarily creating a multinational military tribunal.
The United States also argued strongly against the attempt to prosecute persons high in authority for acts committed by their subordinates. In its dissent, the United States stated that in the case of indirect responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war committed after the outbreak of the war, there was an attempt to "punish certain persons, high in authority, particularly the heads of enemy states, even though heads of States were not hitherto legally responsible for the atrocious acts committed by subordinate authorities." 4 This "indirect responsibility" was an issue that the United States would not compromise. 5 For which reasons exactly the United States was so against indirect responsibility are not clear. As the following pages will indicate, it is more likely the United States did not favor the thought of its own nationals in higher authority ever being indicted by an international tribunal. Without precedent or support for the court, the possibility of a United States national in higher authority ever being prosecuted in an international court was diminished. In its dissent of an international criminal tribunal and the prosecutions of persons in higher authority, the United States was not concerned with the past but the future.
III. POST Declaration, which was the first jointly signed proclamation that the Allied powers would prosecute the hierarchy of German war criminals when the war ended. 7 On 24 March 1944, Franklin Roosevelt declared that:
[i]t is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished. The United Nations have made it clear that they will pursue the guilty and deliver them up in order that Justice be done. That warning applies not only to the leaders but also to their functionaries and subordinates in Germany and in the satellite countries.
All who knowingly take part in the deportation of Jews to their death in Poland, or Norwegians and French to their death in Germany are equally guilty with the executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the punishment. 8 The words of President Roosevelt are quite clear that the United States had changed its policy from post WWI when it dissented against prosecuting those indirectly responsible for crimes. Not only was the executioner responsible, but also all participants, including persons of higher authority, were "equally guilty with the executioner." However, the Allied victors would be careful to create a tribunal particularly for the prosecution of certain persons in higher authority that they would agree.
WWII 12 He contemplated that the United States should prosecute alone saying that "the idea of separate trials for each nation for the trial of its separate groups of prisoners may be the easiest and most satisfactory way of reconciling it.' 3 In early June, Justice Jackson made clear in his report to the President that the United States case would preferably be conducted in "association with others, but alone if necessary."' 4 The United States had in its custody many German war criminals 15 and was capable of successfully prosecuting them. Eventually, Justice Jackson would win the argument and the Soviet Union agreed that the IMT would not be a show trial with pre-decided verdicts.
The United States insisted that it was important to prosecute together and establish a precedent that certain crimes would not be tolerated by the international society. The United States remained consistent with its dissent for creating an international criminal tribunal after WWI. The IMT was a multinational military tribunal with "international character" and "formed by the union of existing national military tribunals or commissions,"' 6 which is the type of court that the United States favored after WWI.
The United States did, however, change its policy regarding prosecuting persons with higher authority who were indirectly responsible
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IV. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
In 1946, while the IMT at Nuremberg had completed and the IMTFE was still in session, there begun discussion concerning the creation of a permanent ICC or a court with international criminal jurisdiction. With the exception of much criticism, the IMT was considered a success, overall. As a result, the General Assembly The GA also developed a committee to consider the creation of a permanent ICC and to draft a statute for the court. 25 The committee reported to the GA in 1952 and stated that a permanent ICC was feasible. 26 Unfortunately, with the lack of a definition for the crime of aggression and the height of the Cold War, the project was suspended indefinitely. 
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Preceding the instructions to the ILC by the GA to consider the creation of a permanent ICC, there was much debate during the drafting of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2 8 adopted in 1948. Originally, Article VI of the Genocide Convention legally obligated states to an ICC if genocide, 29 or other acts of genocide, 30 were committed. This legal obligation of states to an ICC was controversial and many states, including the Soviet "bloc," argued such a court violated state sovereignty and states were only obligated to courts already established under national jurisdiction.
The United States representatives, however, favored adopting a convention that included establishing an ICC. 31 Prior to the Genocide Convention, a draft convention was prepared by the United Nations (UN) Secretariat. The Secretariat's draft referred to the ICC in Article IX as obligatory for state parties to the Convention under two conditions. Article IX read as follows: 
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Ad Hoc Committee. 3 4 It held meetings from 5 April through 10 May 1948 and published its report on 24 May 1948. 35 Although the Ad Hoc Committee previously decided to use the Secretariat's draft convention as a basis, which stipulated that "[t]he High contracting Parties pledge themselves to commit all persons guilty of genocide under this Convention for trial to an international court, ' 36 it later decided only to take it into consideration. 3 7 The Ad Hoc Committee would drastically revise the Secretariat drafts' provisions regarding an ICC. 38 During the discussions, there was more agreement on the principle of an international criminal jurisdiction rather than an ICC. 39 John Maktos proposed the creation of an ICC that would have a complementary role to national courts. His proposal stated: "Assumption of jurisdiction by the international tribunal shall be subject to a finding by the tribunal that the state in which the crime was committed has failed to take adequate measures to punish the crime." 40 The United States proposal was defeated in a vote of 5-1 and was not included in the draft convention. 41 The mention of an ICC in the Draft Convention was subtle. Article VII reads as follows: "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal. '' 2 The majority of states were not ready for an ICC and agreed that more research had to be completed. To prevent the Genocide Convention from not being adopted, the United States proposed that the problem of the ICC be dealt with in a separate Convention to be drafted by the ILC 43 and the court, if created, would have jurisdiction over states that accepted jurisdiction through ratification. The GA adopted the Genocide Convention on 9 December 1948. Article VI stated that persons accused of genocide would be prosecuted by the state on which territory the crime was 
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Id. at 56. The completion of the Genocide Convention was not the completion of internal debates within the United States concerning Article VI. 45 There was much urging to ratify the Genocide Convention for two reasons: (1) ratifying the Convention would not contract the United States to the jurisdiction of a future ICC. There was no court at the time and if one came to effect, the United States did not have to accept its jurisdiction; 46 (2) Genocide had never existed, nor could it ever exist in the United States guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. 47 During the 1950s Senate Hearings, opponents of Article VI feared the Genocide Convention and any future ICC could be used politically against the United States, including national racial segregation. Even though segregation did not include the special intent dolus specialis to destroy the group, in whole or in part, required under Article II, 4 8 there was certainly fear that the argument could be made.
The fear of politically motivated accusations of genocide by the United States was soon justified. On 17 December 1951, the Civil Rights Congress submitted a petition to the UN titled "We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People." 49 The allegation stated "that within an unspecified number of years 10,000 negroes were killed and that the US Government intends the destruction of 15 million negroes. 50 Earlier in the year, the United States learned that the Soviet Union was aware of the accusation and stated, "[i]t is to be expected that the accusation of genocide vs. the American Negro will be publicized by all means within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), regardless whether the charge is formally accepted on the GA agenda."'I 44.
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Though nothing significant developed from the petition against the United States for the crime of genocide against American Negroes, this was an example that countries against each other could use charges of international crimes politically.
States at the Genocide Convention, particularly the Soviet "bloc" understood that some of their national laws of oppression could arguably be considered international crimes, if not genocide. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention for nearly forty years after its adoption by the GA. On 23 November 1988 the United States submitted its ratification of the Genocide Convention. However, an earlier resolution was passed concerning the ratification. 2 In the resolution, the United States confirmed that its nationals would not be within the jurisdiction of any future ICC by stating:
That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in Article VI of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
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Seventeen states other than the United States submitted draft statute proposals to the UN Secretary General for consideration. 79 On 8 May 1993, the SC adopted the tribunal's statute, officially activating the ICTY to bring to justice "persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.8o
Eventually Justice Richard Goldstone was appointed Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY. Soon after, he was invited to the UN in New York for a briefing. 8 ' He received great support from the United States when he arrived in New York. He stated: I was warmly welcomed by Madeleine Albright, who had played the leading role in having the tribunal established. Her continued support for the work of the Yugoslavia tribunal, and later the Rwanda tribunal, was crucial to their success. She appointed one of her senior advisors, David Scheffer, to take special responsibility for moving the work of the tribunal forward. David became a friend and adviser to me, especially with regard to my contacts with the various branches of the
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